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VALIDITY OF PARTICIPATION TRUSTS-STATUS OF PURCHASERS
OF PARTICIPATING CERTIFICATES
In Ulmer v. Fulton, Supt. of Banks, 129 Ohio St. 323, 195 N.E.
557 (I935), the plaintiff representing a majority of participation cer-
tificate holders sought to enjoin the transfer of the trust res to a new
trustee, after the original trustee failed as a banking institution. The
certificate holders sought the position of general creditors of the bank,
for in this way they would realize more on their certificates than if they
were compelled to satisfy their claims from the trust res. The court
decided that the creation of the trust by the bank, which acted as settlor
trustee, Was an ultra vires act, was contra to public policy, and not
within the power granted it by the Banking Act, Gen. Code, Sec. 710
et seq., and therefore was void. The net result of this case was to put
the certificate holder in a position better than that previously occupied
as the cestui in the trust.
Since the actual holding in the Ulmer case was that the purchasers
of participating certificates were general creditors, the declaration that
the trust was void as contra to public policy may, if later fact situations
demand it, be limited to the facts in the particular case. It seems a
pretty complete destruction of a useful business and investment device, if
the syllabus in the Ulmer case is to be taken literally in all circumstances.
In a recent case, State ex rel Squire v. The Central United National
Bank, 4 Ohio Op. 485, 2o Abs. 238 (935), Judge Hertz of the
Cuyahoga Common Pleas Court decided that facts existed for such an
interpretation of the Ulmer case. The suit was instigated by the Super-
intendent of Banks to have the trust declared void. It was the position
of the common pleas court that the participation certificate holders only
were to have the alternative privileges of having the trust set aside, or
of having it continued with the successor trustee. The court in refusing
to upset the trust stated that the bank could not set up such abuse of its
own authority to defeat its contract with the cestuis. Participation trusts
are not improper when the settlor does not act as trustee, it was there-
fore held that the trust should not be considered void, but merely void-
able. Bowden v. Citizens Loan & Trust Co., 259 N.W. 815 (Minn.
1935) ; Bogert, Trusts & Trustees, Sec. 676 (1935).
Even if it is conceded that the participation trust was void, because
the bank did not have the power under the Banking Act to act in the
dual capacity of settlor trustee, the question remains what is to be done
with the res? The trust can be considered void ab initio, in which event
the res would still be in the settlor. Under those circumstances the
cestuis in the participation trust would have to come in as creditors
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of the settlor under the broad view of the Ulmer case. The case being
one of first impression certain analogies may be suggested. The follow-
ing might have a bearing in disposing of the trust res: first, declare a
resulting trust for the cestuis; or perhaps, second, a constructive trust
for the cestuis; third, establish an equitable lien for the cestuis; or,
fourth, apply the principle of marshalling assets.
A resulting trust arises in any of three situations: first, where one
pays the purchase money for property, but takes title to it in another's
name; second, when an express trust fails in whole or in part; and
third, where there is a surplus after the trust is administered. This case
would fall within the second class, if this solution is suitable. A partici-
pation trust is a perfectly legal business device, when validly created.
Cases falling within the second class of resulting trusts have been upheld
where the express trust failed. For example: Where the beneficiary
was not named in the trust, Union Trust Co. of Pittsburg v. McCari-
gin, 24 F (2d) 459 (D.C. 1927); Byron v. Bigelow, 77 Conn. 604,
6o A. 266 (1905); where the cestuis were named with uncertainty,
Clark v. Campbell, 82 N.H. 281, 133 A. 166, 45 A.L.R. 1433
(1926); Davison v. Wyman, 214 Mass. 192, IOO N.E. 115o
( 1913) ; where the trust was illegal under the rule against perpetuities;
St. Pauls Church v. Atty. General, 164 Mass. 188, 41 N.E. 231
(1895); Lillys Estate, 272 Pa. 143, 28 A.L.R. 366 (1922); Armory
v. Trustees of Amherst College, 229 Mass. 374, 18 N.E. 933
( 1918); where the express trust failed for indefiniteness or impossibil-
ity; Bosset v. Palletti, Andretta & Co., 117 Conn. 58, 166 A. 752
(1933). The device of a resulting trust is used in such cases by the
court to effectuate the intent of the settlor. Bogert, Trusts & Trustees,
sec. 468 (1935). See 9 Cinn. L. Rev. 940 (1935). Although the
express trust in this case was not validly created it is possible that the
doctrine underlying the cases mentioned, and many others, would not
be extended unwarrantedly by applying the present facts.
Secondly, the court could use the device of a constructive trust to
prevent the depositors from being unjustly enriched at the expense of
the certificate holders. If the creditors of the bank had been permitted
to share in the trust res, they would have been enriched to the extent of
the original money paid for the res, which went into the general assets
of the bank and was available to creditors. See generally, Davis v. Otty,
35 Beav. 208 (Chan. 1865); Duncan v. Dazey, 318 Ill. 500, 149
N.E. 495 (1925); Bogert, Trusts & Trustees, Sec. 471, 501 (935).
It would be possible to establish an equitable lien on the proceeds of
the res for the certificate holders. The cestuis, upon paying good con-
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sideration for their certificates, thought they were actually becoming
cestuis in a trust. However, by principles of equity, where the trust is set
aside, the certificate holders may be given a lien on the res which was
purchased with their money. The lien in this instance would give the
certificate holders a preference over general creditors as to the proceeds
of the res. A dictum from Seiger v. Seiger, 162 Minn. 322, 202 N.W.
742 (1925), advanced the point that, where a trustee wrongfully
invests money, the beneficiary may have a lien or a charge upon the res.
Lastly, it is remotely possible to apply the theory of marshalling
assets. According to the Ulmer case the creditors of the bank are
allowed to satisfy their claims from the general assets of the bank, and
from the trust res also. It would only seem equitable to require the
creditors of the bank to come against the general assets first, and leave
the res for the certificate holders, with whose money the res was pur-
chased. See McMahan v. Fetherstonhaugh, I I.R. 83 (1895).
By the above four solutions, the cestui is put in status quo to the
detriment of no other claimant. If Squire v. Central United National
Bank is carried to the Supreme Court the Ulmer case may be reaffirmed
in its sweeping nullification of the trust in the interest of general cred-
itors, or it may be limited, and a remedy adopted in the interest of the
certificate holders. It is a choice of policies.
SEYMOuR A. TREITELMAN
WORKMENS COMPENSATION
EXEMPTION OF AWARD FROM ATTACHMENT AFTER PAYMENT
TO INJURED EMPLOYEE
Plaintiff employee recovered an award under the provisions of the
Workmens' Compensation Act, and deposited it in a bank unmixed
with other funds. There it was attached by plaintiff's creditors for the
payment of pre-existing debts. Plaintiff petitioned the Common Pleas
Court of Stark County to have the funds declared exempt from execu-
tion. The court held that compensation was not exempt from attach-
ment and execution after payment in view of the express working of
Section 1465-88 Ohio General Code. Talaba v. luld, i 9 Abs. 676, 3
Ohio Op. 556, affirmed by the Court of Appeals without opinion in
4 Ohio Op. 252 (I935).
The pertinent part of Section 1465-88 of the Ohio General Code
provides that "Compensation before payment shall be exempt from all
claims of creditors and from any attachment or execution, and shall be
paid only to such employees or their dependents."
